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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF MIGNON DENHALTER LEWIS 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case No. 
7724 
This is a proceeding for the determination of 
whether or not William H. English is entitled to a por-
tion of the estate of Mignon Denhalter 'Lewis. Mr. 
English claims that his father, William Henry Johnston, 
was a natural son of Henry Charles Denhalter, who was 
a brother of the deceased, Mignon Denhalter Lewis. 
That while his father was admittedly born out of law-
ful wedlock, it is the claim of Mr. English that he is 
none the less entitled to participate in the distribution 
of the estate of Mrs. Lewis because of being the natural 
grandchild of Henry Charles Denhalter and on account 
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2 
of Henry Charles Denhalter having acknowledged the 
father of the claimant as his (Henry Charles Denhal-
ter's) child and on account of said Henry Charles Den-
halter having married the grandmother of the claimant. 
Three of the admitted lawful sons of Henry Charles 
Denhalter are resisting the claim of Mr. English. 
It is established without controversy that Mignon 
Denhalter Lewis died without leaving surviving her any 
children, parents or husband and that the next of kin 
was a sister who was entitled to one-half of the estate 
and the he~irs at law of her deceased brother, who are 
entitled to the other one-half of her estat.e. The Court 
concluded that the three lawful sons of the deceased 
brother of Mrs. Lewis and Mr. English the claimant are 
entitled to share and share alike in the one-half of the 
residue of the estate of Mrs. Lewis. The three lawful 
sons of Henry Charles Denhalter contend that the claim-
ant, William H. English, is not entitled to participate in 
the distribution of the estate of Mrs. Lewis and they are 
prosecuting this appeal from the decree and judgment 
awarding to William H. English a part of the estate 
of Mrs. Lewis. 
In order to give the court a better understanding of 
the matters which divide the parties to this proceed-
ing, we have deemed it advisable to give the court an 
abstract of the material pa_rt of the evidence which was 
offered at the trial. 
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It 'Yas n1ade to appear at the trial 'vithout dispute 
that Henry C~harles Denhalter, the clailned grandfather 
of the elailnant, \Y.illirun H. English, died on August 10, 
1931. 
That William Henry Johnston, the father of the 
claimant, died on April 29, 1937. 
That Mrs. Mignon Denhalter Lewis died on Sep-
tember 5, 1949 (Tr. 3) and that claimant was born out 
of wedlock. ( Tr. 5) 
William John Clark, a witness called by claimant, 
testified in substance as follows: That he resides at 375 
Eighth East Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, where he 
has lived since 1903. That he was acquainted with and 
a friend of a family by the name of Johnston, but not 
related to them. That one of the J ohnstons was a police 
officer. (Tr. 5) That he had a number of cleaning women 
work for him, one of whose name was a Mrs. Rosa; 
that there was a child born at his home. Over objection 
of counsel for the Denhalter boys that the testimony 
was hearsay, he was permitted to testify. That his wife 
made arrangements with a Dr. Root about bringing a 
girl to his home to be confined. (Tr. 6) The girl didn't 
even want to see the baby. She was not at his home 
more than 3 days; that he never saw the girl; that his 
wife told him about the child born at his home and that 
it was a boy. (Tr. 8) That Mrs. Rosa's daughter had 
the child; that a child was in the home of Mr. Clark a 
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number of times after it was born. That the J ohnstons 
had the child; that he had difficulty in remembering; 
that he has nearly lost his mind. (Tr. 10) That after 
the child was born, Charles Denhalter and the child's 
mother came to his home and demanded the child about 
a year or less after the child was born; that when the 
witness went to the door, Charlie Denhalter threatened 
to beat the witness up because he would not tell him 
where the child was. He told Charlie Denhalter that 
he didn't know where the child was, but it was out of 
the state. (Tr. 11) That he had not seen the woman 
who came with Charlie Denhalter to get the child before 
the time they came to his house; that he saw quite often 
the child that the J ohnstons had for four or five years 
or maybe five or six years after they received it. (Tr. 12) 
That when he next saw Henry William Johnston, he was 
a grown man; that was in 1927 when Henry William 
Johnston asked if he, Mr. Clark, would tell him, John-
ston, who his father was and if he would go to court and 
swear who his father was which he, Clark, said he did; 
that he, Clark, told Johnston that his father was Charlie 
Denhalter; (Tr. 13) that Mr. Denhalter called up Clark 
and said- that his statement about being the father of 
Johnston raised a big dis~turbance in his family; that 
he nearly lost his wife on account of doing that; that he 
was going to knock his block off. (Tr. 14) 
On cross-examination he testified that he was a bar-
tender and was not running a hotel or a hospital at the 
time the child was born in his home; that he had never 
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seen the supposed 1nother of the baby born in his home 
until she caine and den1anded the baby; (Tr. 14) that 
he didn't kno"'" that the baby born in his ho1ne was taken 
to the Johnston's ho1ne except froin what he "\Vas told 
by the women folks~ that he ,,~as a "vitness to the adop-
tion of the child by the J ohnstons; (Tr. 15) that after 
the child was taken into the Johnston home, he saw it 
about t'vice a Inonth until it \vas three or four years old 
and then he did not see him for about 18 years. (Tr. 16) 
Mary Ann English testified that she married her 
present husband in 1937 and that she married Mr. John-
ston, her former husband in 1927 or 1924. (Tr. 18) That 
she came to Salt Lake City in 1927 and met her hus-
band's family consisting of Mrs. Johnston and Frances 
Loveless; that she also met the Denhalters; that Mrs. 
Denhalter came to the hospital while she was there; that -
Mr. Denhalter wanted them to come to their home; 
(Tr. 19) that arrangements were made to have Mrs. 
Julia Hummel come t.o Salt Lake; (Tr. 20) that before 
she was a Hummel her name was Julia Rosa Denhalter. 
(Tr. 21) That Mr. Denhalter seemed to be quite happy 
that he had found Henry Johnston; that Mr. and Mrs. 
Henry Charles Denhalter provided money for the living 
expenses of the \vitness and her then husband; (Tr. 22) 
that the Denhalters got a house for the witness and her 
husband and the J ohnstons let them have some furni-
ture; that the \vitness and her husband resided in the 
home secured for the1n five or six months and then moved 
back to the Denhalters, where the child, claimant herein, 
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was born. That when Mr. Denhalter was home he treated 
the witnesses son the same as his children; that she 
stayed at the Denhalte-r home until her child was four or 
five months old; (Tr. 23) that the witness and her 
husband moved into an auto court (Tr. 25) and soon 
thereafter she and her husband separated and Mr. Den-
halter told her husband that if he did not treat his wife, 
the witness, better he would disown him and that she 
could come and stay at the home of the Denhalters; that 
off and on she stayed at the Denhalter's home with her 
son, the claimant herein, until the boy was five years 
old; (Tr. 26) that since the death of Henry Charles 
Denhalter, the Denhalter family have been very con-
genial with the witness; that on one occasion Dick or 
Richard Denhalter said that the claimant's father was 
his half-brother; (Tr. 27) that the Denhalter boys were 
not denying that; that the claimant was a grandson of 
their father, (Tr. 29) but they thought that he was not 
entitled to as much of the estate of Mrs. Lewis as they 
were; (Tr. 30) that the witness has attempted to get 
Julia Rosa Denhalter Hummel to come and testify for 
her; that she has not been able to get in touch with her 
since she last talked with her which was in 1950; a 
returned letter addressed to Mrs. Julia Hummel, 1020 
West 89th, Los Angeles, California, was received in evi-
dence over the objections of counsel for the Denhalter 
boys. (Tr. 31-32) 
On cross-examination, Mrs. English .testified that she 
was 23 years of age when she first came to Salt Lake 
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City~ that her husband "'"as then ~2 years of age; (Tr. 33) 
that her husband was about 19 years of age when she 
first 1net hin1 in Boston, 'vhere he was employed as a 
n1ale nurse; that she and her husband were in Salt Lake 
about nine months or a year before they 1net the Den-
halters: that after the birth of her baby she and her 
husband had trouble; that she called up the Denhalters 
and told then1 her husband had beaten her and they came 
down and took her to their home; (Tr. 34) that her 
husband had been at the Denhalter home some time be-
fore he and ~Ir. Denhalter had trouble because her hus-
band was stealing and selling Denhal'ter's guns, etc. ; 
that Mr. Denhalter told the husband of the witness that 
if he did not treat her better, he didn't want to see him 
again; that ~Ir. Denhalter tried to get a job for the hus-
band of the witness but he could not hold a a job; (Tr. 35) 
that Mr. Denhalter said he would make room for the 
witnesses husband and he, Denhalter, was glad to find 
him after all these years and he sent for the mother of 
the boy. (Tr. 36) 
Mary Frances Johnston Loveless testified for the 
claimant. She testified that she is the daughter of John 
Henry Johnston, who was a police sergeant at the time 
he was killed, which occurred on July 5, 1911; (Tr. 37) 
that she remembers that in 1905 of going to Bill Clark's 
with her folks; that she was six or seven years old and 
she went out into the kitchen and saw a girl sitting with 
this baby on her lap getting its clothes on and Mrs. Clark 
was helping; the baby was a boy and the baby grew up in 
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the Johnston home and was named William Henry John-
ston; that some time after she was visiting at the Clark 
home with her father and mother and was playing in the 
front yard when this girl came with a boy and went into 
the house, and the girl said "I know the people are here 
with the baby because the little girl that was here that 
came out in the kitchen when they took the baby, is play-
ing in the front yard," and she says, ''and also the baby's 
bonnett is laying right over there on the couch, so I know 
they are in the house. Of course there was a big argu-
ment and they left and my folks were out in the hack of 
the house with the baby; (Tr. 38) she was permitted to 
testify over objection that her mother kept a chest and 
the witness looked in the chest and found a little piece 
of paper that had 'the name Julia Rosa on it and Charles 
Henry Denhalter and the baby's age." A motion to strike 
the foregoing evidence was by the court denied. (Tr. 40) 
Mrs. Loveless further testified 'that when William 
Henry Johnston came back from Boston with his wife 
that she told him that his father was Henry Denhalter 
and where he lived and she thought he ought to go meet 
him; that because of doing so, Mrs. Loveless's mother 
wanted to disown her; that the conversation with he.r 
adopted brother occurred about a month after he came 
to Salt Lake. ( Tr. 41) 
On cross-examination, the witness testified that 
when the couple came to the Clark home they wanted the 
baby, but she didn't know what was said; that the time 
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the couple came to get the baby \Vas after they were rnar-
ried \vhich as is sho'vn by the nu1rriage certificate, which 
was received in evidence, occurred on July 31, 1905. (Tr. 
4:2) That they said they \van ted the baby. (Tr. 45) That 
she "Tas six or seven years old at the tin1e. (Tr.46) 
Mrs. Elizabeth Denhalter, the surviving widow of 
Henry Charles Denhalter was called as a wi-tness by the 
claimant and testified that she met Henry Johnston and 
his wife when they came to Salt Lake in June 1926 ; that 
she saw 1Irs. Johnston, now Mrs. English, in the hospital 
and they were later taken into the home of the witness 
and her husband; that Mrs. Johnston was ill at the time; 
that when they came to the Denhalter home, she didn't 
recall her husband saying anything, (Tr. 48) that she 
knew that her husband had been married and divorced 
when she married him; that Mr. Denhalter's first wife 
was named Julia Rosa and later she married a Mr. Hum-
mel; (Tr. 49) that Mr. Denhalter asked the witness about 
having the mother of Henry Johnston come to the Den-
halter house and Mrs. Denhalter told him to do as he 
saw fit; that Mr. Denhalter advanced the money for Mrs. 
Hummel to come to Salt Lake, but the same was later 
repaid to Mr. Denhalter by Mrs. Hummel. That Mrs. 
Hummel came late in August and stayed quite some time; 
that Mrs. Denhalter got very tired of her and almost 
had to kick her out; that she left late in the fall; that 
Mrs. Johnston was sick and needed help and Mrs. Den-
halter was glad to help her; that she didn't know what 
went on between Mr. and Mrs. Johnston and her husband; 
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( Tr. 50) that when the J ohnstons took up housekeeping 
on their own account, the Denhalters helped them and 
paid the rent; that Mrs. Johnston came off and on to 
the Denhalter home because her husband didn't furnish 
her a home; that Mrs. Denhalter took care of Mrs. John-
ston when her baby was born, who is the claimant in this 
proceeding; that the mother went to work when the baby 
was about 10 months old. (Tr. 51-a) 
On cross-examination, 1\{rs. Denhal ter testified that 
Mrs. Hummel probably did not stay quite two months; 
that the Johnston boy was sick while he was at the Den-
halter home; that the Johnston boy and Mr. Denhalter 
had difficulty right from the beginning; that the John-
ston boy took things and finally Mr. Denhalter kicked 
him out; that upon one occasion his wife, now Mrs. 
English, called the Denhalters in the middle of the night 
because her husband had thrown her out and the Den-
halters went and got her and took her to the Denhalter 
home. (Tr. 51-b) That at that time her son, the claimant, 
was not more than two or three months old. (Tr. 52-53) 
The claimant called as a witness a Mrs. Rella Glea-
son, who testified that she knew Julia Rosa as a girl; 
that they lived in the same neighborhood as girls; that 
she remembered Julia Rosa and Henry Charles Den-
hal'ter keeping company and of their being married. (Tr. 
52) 
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:Jirs. Ann Clark English, the wife of the claimant, 
'vas called as a "\Yitness and after n1uch hedging and 
leading, she testified that Dick Denhalter stated that 
claimant's father "\Yas his half-brother. (Tr. 56-58) 
vVilliam Henry English, the claimant, testified on 
his own behalf and stated that on one occasion when he 
was being introduced one of the Denhalter boys said that 
he, William English, was his nephew; that on another 
occasion the three Denhalter boys met with the claimant 
and his father and mother to talk over the matter of 
settling their rights in the property of the estate of 
Mrs. Lewis, at which time Jack Denhalter finally said: 
"We are not denying that you are, but you are not en-
titled to as much of it as we are." A motion to strike this 
evidence because it was an attempt to compromise the 
litigation was denied. 
Alvin Ray English was called as a witness for the 
claimant and testified that he is the adopted father of 
William English, the claimant herein; that he had been 
quite active in investigating the claim of his adopted son; 
that up to the time the Denhalter boys employed an at-
torney rthe Denhalters had not denied that William 
English was in the blood line of the Denhalters; (Tr. 
87) that he recalled the time when the three Denhalter 
boys had a talk with him, his wife and adopted son; that 
they gave the impression that they wanted to settle the 
property of Mrs. Lewis ; that at that time nothing was 
said about whether or not William English was a Den-
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halter; that at one time he went with the Denhalter boys 
to consult a lawyer about the Lewis estate. (Tr. 88-89) 
On cross-examination he testified that he had adopted 
and taken care of the claimant since he was a small boy. 
(Tr. 89) 
The Denhalters offered in evidence some court 
records which show that Julia R. Denhalter secured a 
divorce from Henry C. Denhalter on July 29, 1910. (Tr. 
64-67) No mention is made in the decree of the parties 
having had any children. It was further made to appear 
from the court records that John Henry J ohns'ton and 
his wife, Tishia B. Johnston sought to and were permitted 
to adopt an illegitimate child, the son of Julia Roberts. 
(Tr. 69-70) The decree is dated January 8, 1906. (Tr. 
71-72) 
1ng: 
As a part of the court records appears the follow-
Adoption of William Henry Johnston 
To Whom it may concern: 
This is to certify that I the undersigned, the 
Mother of an infant boy do hereby relinquish 
any claim I have to said child and consent 
that said boy be adopted by whomsoever the 
court may see fit to give him to, and I here-
by waive all notice of adoption and consent 
that it may be done without any notice to me. 
Witness: 
Mrs. W. J. Clark 
W. J. Clark 
Julia Roberts 
Mother (Tr. 71) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
The Consent to adoption is not dated. 
The Denhalter boys 'vere sworn and denied having 
introduced the clain1ant as their nephew. Charles Richard 
Denhalter testified that he did not recall saying anything 
to the claiinant's "rife about being related to the claim-
ant's father. ( Tr. 7-±) He further testified that he recalled 
that he and his brothers n1et with the claimant and his 
adopted father and mother when they talked about the 
estate of Mrs. Lewis; that Mr. English, the adopted 
father of the claimant, had assured the three Denhalter 
boys that he had conclusive evidence that the claimant 
was a Denhalter and they went to find out about the 
facts and to see what could be done'. (Tr. 74-75) 
On cross-examination he testified that he heard that 
the claimant had received $1500.00 out of his grand-
father's estate, but that he didn't know how it came about 
that the $1500.00 was paid, (Tr. 77) whether it came out 
of the estate or was paid by Mrs. Campbell to prevent 
notoriety about the matter. As to the occasion of the 
Denhalter boys meeting with the claimant and her mother 
and father, the testimony of the two other Denhalter 
boys is substantially the same as that above summarized. 
(Tr. 78) 
In order to properly construe the law of this state 
touching children born out of wedlock, we have thus 
deemed it necessary to summarize the evidence. We shall 
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have further comments to make about the evidence in 
connection with the various provisions of our statutory 
law. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
The appellants assign the following errors upon 
which 'they rely for reversal of the Judgment appealed 
from: 
POINT ONE 
The trial court erred in admitting over the objection 
of the appellants the following testimony of the witness 
William John Clark. 
(a) Well, the arrangements were made between the 
doctor and my wife and this girl's Mother to bring the 
baby there or the girl to have her baby, and it was to be 
given to the J ohnstons. This girl didn't even want to see 
the baby and gave it away as quickly as possible .. (Tr. 8) 
(b) She, his wife, told him about the birth of the 
child in his home. 
(c) She, his wife, told him that Mrs. Rosa's daugh-
ter was the Mother of the child and that it was a boy. 
(Tr. 9) 
(d) That Julia Rosa was the one who p·urported 
to have had the child in his home. (Tr. 12) 
(e) ThaJt he saw the baby born in his home in the 
Johnston home. (Tr. 12) 
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POINT TWO 
The trial court erred in admitting in evidence, over 
the objection of the appellants and in refusing :to strike, 
the following testimony of the witnesses Mary Frances 
Johnston Loveless. 
a() ~Iy Mother kept a chest. I guess I can tell 
that-and I looked in this chest and found a little piece 
of paper that had the nan1e Julia Rosa on it and Charles 
Henry Denhalter and the baby's age, and I guess that 
is about all that was on it, just a little piece of paper 
about like this. ( Tr. 40) 
POINT THREE 
The trial court erred in finding that William H. 
English, the claimant, is the grandson of Henry Charles 
Denhalter because such finding is not supported by any 
substantial competent evidence. (R. 6) 
POINT FOUR 
The trial court erred in making its Conclusion of 
Law that the claimant, William H. English, is entitled 
to participate in the distribution of the estate of Mignon 
Denhalter Lewis, deceased. (R. 8) 
POINT FIVE 
The trial court erred in awarding to the claimant, 
William H. English, a part of the estate of Mignon Den-
halter Lewis, deceased. (R. 10) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the 
testimony of the witness William John Clark as to what 
he was told by his wife. 
The trial court admitted In evidence the hearsay 
testimony of the witness Clark, apparently upon the 
theory that such testimony falls within an exception to 
the hearsay rule in that it was testimony touching pedi-
gree. There are two reasons why the testimony of Mr. 
Clark as to what he was told by his wife does not fall 
within the rule. First, what Mrs. Clark told her husband 
was not in any sense a matter of family history or pedi-
gree and second, neither Mr. Clark nor his wife were 
competent witnesses to give hearsay testimony as to the 
pedigree of the Denhalters. 
The authorities teach that hearsay evidence as to the 
history of a family or what is frequently referred to as 
pedigree may be established by hearsay testimony. How-
ever, what Mrs. Clark told her husband about Mrs. Rosa's 
daughter being confined in his home, about the arrange-
ments made to have the child adopted by the J ohnstons, 
about the child being a boy, about a Dr. Root waiting on 
the woman who was confined in his home, etc., is ob-
viously not a matter of family history or pedigree. More-
over, it is quite generally held that "declarations (as to 
pedigree) must not only have been made by a person 
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since deceased, but Innst also have been made by a person 
related by blood or affinity \Yith so1ne branch of the 
family, the pedigree 'vhich is in question." Vol. 3, page 
2080, Jones Com1nentaries on Evidence. 
The rule is thus stated in 31 C.J.S., page 976, Sec. 
229. ''While there appears to be son1e authority to the 
contrary as a general rule, for a declaration of pedigree 
to be admissable, it must have been made by someone 
related to the family concerned. Consequently, under 
the general rule, the courts will not receive declarations 
as to pedigree made by intimate friends, or neighbors or 
even by persons living in the family, or by servants, how-
ever trustworth, or however long employed in the family." 
Cases are cited in footnotes to the texts which support 
the same. 
POINT TWO 
The testimony of Mrs. Loveless that she saw a paper 
in her Mother's chest containing "the name of Julia Rosa 
. 
and Charles Henry Denhalter and the baby's age" was 
clearly incompetent. (Tr. 40) 
Before written evidence of pedigree may be received 
in evidence it must be made to appear that the writing 
was made or recognized by some member of the family 
whose pedigree is brought in question. Vol. 3, page 2110 
Sec. 1148 Jones Commentaries on Evidence. 
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POINT THREE 
The only ~testimony of probative value as to the 
parentage of the claimant, other than incomp,etent hear-
say testimony elicited from the witness Clark, is that this 
girl, the mother of this baby, and her husband Charles 
came to the house and demanded the baby about a year 
or less after its birth and threatened to beat the witness 
up because he wouldn't tell where the child was. (Tr. 10-
12) It may here be noted that Mr. Clark did not, except 
by hearsay, know \vho was the mother of the child that 
was adopted by the J ohnstons nor did he know, except 
by hearsay, where the J ohnstons received the child. 
The ~testimony of the witness Mrs. Loveless, touching 
what she personally knows about the parentage of the 
father of the claimant is that she saw the mother of the 
child dressing it and that at a later time the mother of 
the child and a boy came to get the child and an argu-
ment ensued. (Tr. 38) 
Mrs. Mary Ann English, the mother of the claim-
ant, testified that Mr. Henry Charles Denhalter stated 
that he found his boy after all these years, that he sent 
for the mother of the boy and that Mr. and Mrs. Den-
halter helped her and her husband by letting them live 
in the home of the Denhalters (Tr. 20-23) and later Mr. 
Denhalter ordered the father of the claimant out of his 
house. ( Tr. 35) 
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~Irs. Elizabeth Denhalter, the 8Urviving wido'v of 
Henry Charles Denhalter, testified that she knew that 
her husband sent money to have the purported grand-
nlother of the claimant come to Salt Lake, that she knew 
her husband had been 1narried before she was married 
to him. That she and her husband took him and his wife 
into their home (Tr. 48) and J\tirs. Hummel, the purported 
grand.Inother of the clain1ant, stayed at the Denhalter 
home not quite t'Yo months. (Tr. 51) That the husband 
of the witness, Henry Charles Denhalter, and the John-
ston boy had difficulty from the time he came to the 
Denha!rter home because he, the Johnston boy, would 
take things from the house every chance he got and 
finally her husband kicked him out; that the wife of the 
Johnston boy called her husband up in the middle of the 
night because the Johnston boy had thrown her out while 
they were living in an auto court. (Tr. 51 b) 
The foregoing is a brief summary of all of the evi-
dence touching the admission of Henry Charles Denhalte~r 
as to his relation to the father of the claimant. 
It should be noted at the outset that even if Henry 
Charles Denhalter was the father of an illegitimate 
child, he could not possibly know whether or not Henry 
William Johnston was that child. He had not seen the 
boy, Henry William Johnston, until the latter was a 
matured man of the age of 21 or 22 years of age. So also 
the mo'ther of the child had not seen him from the time 
he was about three days old until he came to Salt Lake 
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when he was 21 or 22 years of age. We have heretofore 
pointed out that the witnesses, Mr. Clark and Mrs. Love-
less, who were permitted to testify about facts calculated 
to establish the claim that Henry Charles Denhalter was 
the father of the Johnston boy did so from hearsay or 
from their own conclusions based upon hearsay. The 
testimony of the mother of the claimant consists mostly 
of conclusions and on cross-examination she, in effect, 
admitted that Henry Charles Denhalter disowned the 
father of the claimant. The meager testimony touching 
the claim that Henry Charles Denhalter was the grand-
father of the claimant should be viewed in the light of 
the fact that Henry Charles Denhalter married the 
mother of the Johnston boy a short time after his birth. 
That being so the fact that Henry Charles Denhalter 
accompanied the purported grandmother of the claimant 
to the Clark home to get the Johnston child would be as 
consistent with Henry Charles Denhalter being the step-
father of the Johnston child as it would be with the claim 
that the Johnston child was the natural child of Den-
halter. Indeed, if Henry Charles Denhalter wa.s the 
father of the Johnston boy it is difficult to understand 
why he did not marry her before the birth of the child. 
I't is also very strange that the purported grandmother 
of the claimant did not appear at the tri~ if Henry 
Charles Denhalter was in truth and in fact the natural 
father of the Johnston boy. We, of course, can appreciate 
thrut Mrs. Hummel the purported Mother of the Johnston 
child would be unable to testify of her own knowledge that 
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~he \YH~ the ntother of the person claiming to be the child 
born to her because she had not seen that child since he 
was three days old. It is the established law in this juris-
diction that one 1nay not be held to be the illegitimate 
child of a n1an and as such entitled to inherit a part of 
his estate unless among other facts it is shown that such 
a claimant is in fact the natural child of the person who 
he claims to be his ancestor. If an acknowledgement of 
parentage is relied upon, such acknowledgement must be 
unambiguous. In re: Roberts Estate 69 Utah 548; 256 
Pac. 1068; In re Newell's Estate 78 U t. 463 ; 5 Pac. 
(2d) 230. 
In any event as we shall presently point out, the 
evidence in this case is not sufficient to support a decree 
or judgment awarding to the claimant any part of the 
esta:te of Mignon Denhalter Lewis, deceased. 
POINTS FOUR and FIVE 
The evidence in this case is wholly insufficient to 
support Conclusions of Law and a Decree awarding to 
William H. English any part of the Estate of Mignon 
Denhalter Lewis, deceased. 
Points four and five go to the same question, namely, 
that the claimant has not brought himself within any pro-
vision of the Laws of Utah that entitle him to any part 
of the estate of Mrs. Lewis. 
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We again direct the attention of the court to a num-
ber of facts which are not in dispute. Such facts are: 
Henry Charles Denhalter, the claimed grandfather 
of the claimant, died on August 10, 1931. (Tr. 4) 
William Henry Johnston, the father of the claimant, 
died on April29, 1937. 
Mignon Denhalter Lewis died on Sept. 5, 1949. (Tr. 
3) That Henry Charles Denhalter was a brother of 
Mignon Denhalter Lewis and that she left surviving her 
three nephews, Charles Richard Denhalter, Robert Keith 
Denhalter and Jackson Henry Denhalter, children of her 
brother, Henry Charles Denhalter, and one sister. That 
William Henry Johnston was born on or about Dec. 24th 
or 29th, 1904. (Tr. 43-46) Julia Roberts, the mother, 
consented to the adoption but the date of the consent 
does not appear. (Tr. 71) That Henry Charles Denhalter 
and Julia Rosa were married on or about July 31, 1905 
(Tr. 47) and were divorced on July 29, 1910. (Tr. 65-67) 
That Henry Charles Denhalter did not see William Henry 
Johnston the natural father of the claimant until 1926. 
(Tr. 18) That the supposed grandmother so far as ap-
pears did not see William Henry Johnston, from the time 
he was about 3 days old until in 1926. (Tr. 18) That the 
claimant' has been adopted· by Alvin Ray English, but 
the date of such adoption does not appear. (Tr. 87) 
So far as we are able to ascertain, in jurisdiction 
where the common law prevails, the following principles 
of law are established: 
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~' .• A. person born out of lawful wedlock is a 
bastard or illegitimate." 7 Am. Jur. page 628, 
Sec. 4. 
Hln the absence of a statute to the contrary 
the mere fact that the parents of an illegitimate 
child n1arry after its birth does not render it legi-
timate." 7 Am. Jur. page 665, Sec. 58 and cases 
there cited. To the same effect see 10 C.J.S., page 
61, Sec. 12 and cases there cited. 
"lT nder both the common and civil law an 
illegitimate child cannot inherit from its father 
or other blood relatives except probably its 
~Iother." See Annotation in 24 A.L.R. 584 and 83 
A.L.R. 1334. 
It is however, within the power of the legislature to 
change the rule and it has been changed in many juris-
dictions, including Utah. See Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S. 
682, 34 L. Ed 832, 11 Sup. Ct. 222 ; Annotation 23 A.L~R. 
586 ; 83 ·A.L.R. 1335 ; Ann cases 1917 C 826; Mansfield 
v. Neff, 43 Utah 258; 134 Pac. 1160. 
There is such a diversity of legislative enactments 
in the various states of the union that precedents touch-
ing a construction of the language of any given statute 
are frequently not available. Some of the statutes confer 
upon an illegitimate child a limited right of inheritance 
from blood relatives, particularly the father and mother, 
while other statutes merely provide that under a desig-
nated state of facts, the illegitimate child is rendered 
legitimate. As we read the Utah laws touching illegiti-
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mate children, some of such statutes confer upon illegi-
tirnate children the right of inheritance from the father 
and mother, while others render such a child legitimate 
without limitation. 
In its Memorandum of Opinion the trial court held 
that the claimant was rendered legitimate by the provi-
sions of U.C.A. 1943 14-2-14, which provides that "If the 
mother of any such child and the father shall at any time 
after its birth intermarry, the child shall in all respects 
be deemed to be legitimate and the bond for its support 
shall thereupon become void." 
The section of the statute just quoted is a part of 
the Chapter on bastardy. 
The bastardy s'tatute was enacted in 1911. In the 
original enactment the section just quoted read thus: 
"If the mother of any bastard child and the reputed 
father shall at any time after the birth intermarry said 
child shall in all respects be deemed to be legitimate and 
the bond for the support of said child shall thereupon 
become void." Laws of Utah 1911, Chapter 62, Sec. 14, 
page 87. In Complied Laws of Utah 1917, the foregoing 
provision was Sec. 393. 
In Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, Sec. 14 of Chapter 
2 of Title 14 is the same as it is at present and as it ap-
pears in U.C.A. 1943 14-2-14 above quoted. Thus the 
status of the claimant must be determined by the pro-
visions of U.C.A. 1943 14-2-14 because Mrs. Lewis, from 
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'vhom clailnant asserts the right to inherit, died on Sept. 
5, 19-±9 and her estate must be distributed by the law as it 
then provided. 
It is, of course, elementary that unless a law is am-
biguous there is no occasion to construe it, and the courts 
may not, under the guise of construction, create an am-
biguity and then proceed to construe the ambiguity thus 
created. 50 Am. Jur. page 204, Sec. 225; Salt Lake Union 
Stock 1T ards v. State Tax Commission, 93 Utah 166; 71 
Pac. (2d) 538; Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 74 Utah 103; 277 Pac. 206. 
If the statute now being discussed read as it did 
prior to 1933, there might be some color to the claim that 
the statute was open to construction because it then read: 
"If the mother of any bastard child and the reputed 
father" etc. and then provided t.hat the bond for its sup-
port should be void. 
The only reason we can conceive of for amending the 
provision of U.C.A., 1943 14-2-14 from the way it ori-
ginally read to the way it now reads was to remove all 
ambiguity in the original language. The expression "such 
a child" in the present law must mean a child that has 
been judicially determined to be the child of the person 
who marries the mother. The word "such" is defined as 
"of that kind, of the like kind, etc." Unless the word 
"such" is to be entirely ignored it must refer to a child 
that has been judicially determined to be the child of 
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the person who marries i'ts mother. If the language "such 
a child" meant any bastard child there would have been 
no purpose of the legislature making the amendment by 
using the expression "such a child" instead of any bastard 
child as was done by the amendment of 1933. So, also by 
substituting the words "the father" in the amendment 
for the words "the reputed father" the legislature must 
have had in mind in the amendment the person who has 
been adjudicated to be the father instead of "the reputed 
father" as used in the act before it was amended. More-
over, if there should be any doubt about the meaning of 
the statute as it now is and since 1933 has been such doubt 
is entirely removed by the language "the bond for its 
support shall thereupon become void." Obviously there 
would be no bond to be declared void except the bond 
of one who has been adjudged the father of a child born 
out of lawful wedlock. 
In connection with what we have said, the attention 
of 1the court is directed to the oft repeated holding of the 
cou:Its that "It is a general rule that the courts, in the. 
interpretation of a statute, may not take, strike or read 
anything out of a statute or delete, subtract or omit any-
thing therefrom." To the contrary it is a cardinal rule of 
statutory construction that significance and effect should, 
if possible, be accorded to every word, phrase, sentence 
and part of an act. 50 Am. Jur. page 219, Sec. 231, and 
50 Am. Jur., page 361, Sec. 358 and case cited in foot 
notes among which is the case of Dunn v. Bryan, 77 Utah 
604; 229 Pac. 253. 
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It \vas urged by counsel for claimant in the court 
below and the trial court in its Memorandum of Decision 
held that statutes calculated to legitimate bastard chil-
dren should be given a liberal and not a strict construc-
tion. Such statement will be found in some of the adjudi-
cated cases. ,V. e have n~ quarrel with such view if and 
when properly applied. In Utah there is no justification 
for applying a different rule of construction for statutes 
dealing with the legitimation of bastard children than is 
applied in the construction of other statutes. U.C.A., 1943 
88-2-2 provides that: 
"The rule of common law that statutes in 
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has 
no application to the statutes of this state. The 
statutes establish the laws of this state respecting 
the subject to which they relate and their provi-
sions and all proceedings under them are to be 
liberally construed with a view to effect the ob-
jects of the statutes and to promote justice." 
The foregoing statute is applicable generally to all statu-
tory laws in this state. 
"A liberal construction is subject to the prin-
ciple that all rules of statutory construction are 
merely for the purpose of ascertaining the in-
tention of the legislature as expressed in the 
statute. It does not permit the courts to effectuate 
its own conception of right by putting into a law 
that which the legislature never intended to be 
there. The doctrine of liberal construction does 
not imply that the legislative mandate may be 
disregarded, or that the words of the statute may 
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be ignored or frittered away, or given an un-
natural or forced meaning. A liberal construction 
does not authorize the courts to read into a statute 
something which does not come within the meaning 
of the language used, or which unreasonably re-
stricts, or enlarges or extends, by implication, the 
scope of the statute, or the plain provisions of 
the law as written, to matters not within the intent 
of the law, or beyond the field of its purpose, or 
contrary to its design, or the meaning of the stat-
ute as indicated by the context. * * *" 50 Am. J ur., 
Sec. 387, page 403 and cases cited in foot notes. 
To hold that U.C.A., 1943 14-2-14 grants to illegitimate 
children the same rights of inheritance from all ancestors 
and collateral blood relatives as are given to legitimate 
children is to ignore the plain language of ou!-" various 
statutes dealing with illegitimate children. 
It is our contention that before an illegitimate child 
is awarded a right to inherit from collateral blood rela-
tives he must bring himself within the provisions of either 
U.C.A., 1943 14-2-14 above quoted, or U.C.A., 1943 14-4-12. 
There is a very good reason why the law making 
powers of Utah should grant to illegitimate children the 
right to inherit from collateral blood relatives when and 
only when either such illegitimate child is judicially deter-
mined to be the natural child of the putative father and 
such father and its mother thereafter marry or when as 
provided in U.C.A., 1943 14-4-12, the father of an illegiti-
mate child, by publicly acknowledging it as his own, 
receiving it as such with the .consent of his wife, if he is 
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it were a legitimate child thereby adopts it as such and 
such child is thereupon deen1ed for all purposes legiti-
mate from the tin1e of its birth. The foregoing provisions· 
of this chapter do not apply to such an adoption. 
In either of the foregoing cases there is notice to 
the world and particularly to the blood relatives of the 
putative father that he claims the child as his child. 
It is a common trait of human nature for people, 
who have accumulated property, to desire that such prop-
erty upon death, pass to persons of their choosing. If a 
person is content, as many are, to have his or her prop-
erty descend according to the law of succession, no pur-
pose is accomplished by making a Will. Generally speak-
ing, people know who are their relatives born in lawful 
wedlock and those who have been adjudicated and treated 
as such. But it is rare that one is advised of a relative's 
illegitimate offspring in the absence of such offspring 
being treated as such. If, therefore, one does not know 
of the existence of an illegitimate child of a blood relative, 
it would be a grave injustice to one dying intestate to 
ordain that his or her property should be inherited by 
a person unknown to him or her, or if known, not advised 
as to any relationship. Such we conceive is the only 
reasonable basis for the legislature making the distinc-
tion that is made in the various provisions of our law 
touching the rights of inheritance of illegitimate children. 
If the legislature had intended to grant illegitimate chil-
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dren full rights of inheritance from all next of kin the 
same as legitimate children, it would have been a simple 
matter to have so provided. There would be no conceiv-
able purpose to have enacted the various provisions to 
which we have and shall call attention if the legislature 
had intended to render an illegitimate child legitimate 
merely because its mother and putative father married 
after its birth. If the court below is right in its construc-
tion of U.C.A. 1943 14-2-14 the adjudication that the 
putative father is in fact the father would be wholly with-
out any legal effect as to the legitimation of an illegiti-
mate child, or to its right to inherit from collateral blood 
relatives. Such a construction is at war with the language 
of U.C.A. 1943 14-2-14. A number of states have provided 
that the marriage of the parents of an illegitimate child 
renders it legitimate, but in such states there are no addi-
tional provisions such as are found in U.C.A. 1943, 14-2-
14. 
We have heretofore quoted the provisions of U.C .. A. 
1943, 14-4-12 where upon a compliance with the provi-
sions thereof an illegitimate child is deemed legitimate 
for all purposes. 
There are various reasons why neither the claimant 
nor his father comes within the provisions of that statute. 
Among them are: Under our statute only minor children 
may be adopted. U.C.A. 1943, 14-4-1 provides: 
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~'.A.ny minor child may be adopted by an adult 
person, or a child, not a minor, whose parents are 
both dead, may be adopted by another adult person 
as in this chapter provided." 
The provisions of lT.C.A. 1943, 14-4-12 and 14-4-1 
have both been taken from California where they were 
construed long before they beca1ne the law of Utah. 
U.C.A. 1943, 14-4-12 is now 230 of the California 1941 
Civil Code. 
The following cases from California have construed 
U.C.A., 1943, 14-4-12: 
Estate of Baird, 193 Cal. 225; 223 Pac. 972; 
Estate of Gird, 157 Cal. 534; 108 Pac. 499; 
137 Am. St. Rep. 131; 
Estate of Jones, 166 Cal. 108; 135 Pac. 288; 
In re Flood's Estate, 21 Pac. (2d) 579; 217 
Cal. 763; 
In re Parcell's Estate, 53 Pac. ( 2d) 784; 
The cases hold that in order to bring an illegitimate 
child within the provisions of U.C.A., 1943, 14-4-12, the 
evidence must establish the following: 
1. That the child is illegitimate. 
2. That the natural father is the person claimed to 
be such. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
32 
3. Public acknowledgment of the claimed father that 
he is such. 
4. That the child was received into the family with 
the wife's consent given with the knowledge of the ille-
gitimacy. 
5. The the child was treated as a legitimate child. 
The case of In re Estate of Pico, 56 Cal. 413, adds 
an additional requisite, namely that the child must be a 
minor at the time it is claimed the adoption occurred. 
Moreover, it is obvious that the claimant's father 
could not be adopted by the Denhalters because he had 
been adopted by the J ohnstons, and such adoption was 
still in effect. A child may not have two sets of adopted 
parents at the same time. 
There is an absence of any evidence that Denhalter 
publicly acknowledged that he was the father of the John-
ston boy. The only evidence of acknowledgment comes 
from Mr. Clark, Mrs. English, the claimant's mother and 
possibly Mrs. Loveless. Indeed, it is not inconsistent with 
their testimony to conclude that Mr. Denhalter merely 
clairp.ed to he ·the stepfather of the Johnston child. As il-
lustration ~f the requirements of public acknowledgment 
required by the courts to entitle an illegitimate child to 
claim a right under a statute such as 1943, 14-4-12, to 
participate in an estate of the alleged father, we direct 
the attention of the court to two cases which show the 
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trend of judicial authority. Record v. Ellis, 97 Kan. 754, 
156 Pac. 712; L.R.A. 1916 Ed. 654 and Bisben v. Hunting-
ton, l~S Iowa 166: 103 N.vV. 1!4. 
Nor does the evidence show that the father of the 
claimant 'vas received into the Denhalter family with 
the wife's consent given with the knowledge of the ille-
gitimacy. The most that can be said to support such a 
claim is that the father of the claimant was sick and Mrs. 
Denhalter made no objection to him and his wife tempo-
rarily coming to their home. They were not received into 
the Denhalter family, but claimant's father and mother 
constituted a family. Mrs. Denhalter knew her husband 
had been married, but she did not know that claimant's 
father was an illegitimate child. Indeed, so far as is made 
to appear, none of the witnesses who testified knew such 
to be the fact. So also is there an absence of evidence 
showing that either Mr. or Mrs. Denhalter treated claim-
ant's father as a legitimate child. Quite to the contrary, 
he apparently had not been at the Denhalter home very 
long until he was kicked out. 
While the court below based its conclusion that the 
claimant had a right to a part of the estate of Mrs. Lewis 
by reason of the provisions of U.C.A. 1943, 14-2-14 there 
are other provisions of our statutory law that require 
discussion. By both that Section and U.C.A., 1943 14-4-12 
an illegitimate child which meets the requirements of 
either of such sections is deemed legitimate. Not so with 
the other provisions of our law. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
34 
U.C.A., 1943, 101-4-10 provides: 
"Every illegitimate child is an heir of the 
person who acknowledges himself to be the father 
of such child and in all cases the heir of his mother 
and inherits his or her estate in whole or in part 
as the case may be in the same manner as if he 
had been born in lawful wedlock. The issue of all 
marriages null in law or dissolved by divorce are 
legitimate." 
It is significant that the foregoing is a part of the 
law of succession. It is even more significant that the 
plain language used therein limits the right of an illegiti-
mate child to being the heir of the mother and the person 
who acknowledges himself to be the father, while a child 
which is the issue of a null or a marriage dissolved by 
divorce is declared to be legitimate. If it were intended 
to make a child legitimate because of an acknowledgment 
by the father, the legislature would doubtless have so 
provided instead of merely providing that such a child 
was the heir of the father who acknowledged his parent-
age. 
The authorities teach that statutory provisions such 
as that just quoted are statutes of descent and not legi-
timate statutes. The law in such particular is thus stated 
in 10 C.J.S., 119 where it is said: 
"While a statute which gives a duly acknowl-
edged or recognized illegitimate child the right to 
inherit from the father has been regarded as 
remedial in nature and as one which should be 
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liberally construed to effect the purpose of its 
enactment, it is an inheritance statute or statute 
of descent and not legitimation statute and after 
recognition or acknowledgment, the child remains 
illegitimate and inherits as an illegitimate child." 
Cases are cited in foot notes which support the text. 
We have found no case which holds that a statute 
such as U.C.A., 1943 101-4-10 has the effect of rendering 
an illegitimate child legitimate. Indeed, to reach such a 
result would do violence to the language used. It would 
enlarge the meaning of the language far beyond the idea 
conveyed. That the Legislature intended to restrict the 
effect of U.C.A., 1943, 101-4-10 to the right to inherit from 
the father and mother is made apparent, because other-
wise it would have used such language as is used in Sec-
tion 14-2-14 where it is said that a child which falls with-
in its provisions "shall in all respects be deemed to be 
legitimate," or such a child as falls within the provisions 
of Section 14-4-12 where it is said that a child which falls 
within all of its provisions is "thereupon deemed for all 
purposes legitimate from the time of its birth," or as is 
said in Section 101-4-10 that "children who are the issues 
of void or dissolved marriages are legitimate." 
To hold that U.C.A., 1943 101-4-10 gives an illegiti-
mate child a right to inherit from an aunt would be to 
re-write or at least substantially add to its provisions. 
If the legislature intended that such a child should inherit 
from collateral relatives, it would have been a simple 
matter to have so provided. By providing that "An ille-
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gitimate child is an heir of the person who acknowledges 
himself to be the father of such a child," there was ex-
cluded the claim that he was an heir of other persons 
except, of course, the mother. The courts uniformly ac-
cept and apply in the construction of the statutes the 
doctrine of "Expressio U nius Est Exclusive Alterius," 
that is the expression of one thing is the exclusion of 
another. There are numerous cases cited in a foot note 
to the text in 35 C.J.S. 283 where the doctrine is applied. 
Numerous other cases will be found collected in 25 C.J. 
note 17, pages 220 to 223, both pages inclusive. We do 
not claim to have read all of such cases and feel certain 
that the court will not undertake such an ardous task. 
However, if the court is interested, it will find the follow-
ing Utah cases cited: 
Zamata v. Browning, 51 Ut. 400; 170 Pac. 
1057; 
Tribune Reporter Printing Co. v. Homer, 51 
Ut. 153; 169 Pac. 170; 
State v. Shockley, 29 Ut. 25; 80 Pac. 865; 867; 
Nichols v. Oregon Short Line R. R. Co., 28 
U t. 319, 78 ~ac. 866. 
Not only do the provisions of U.C.A., 1943 101-4-10 
limit the right of inheritance to the father, but it also 
limits such right to his or her estate. The property of 
Mrs. Lewis was in no sense a part of the estate of Henry 
Charles Denhalter. 
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It should be noted that the authorities are uniform 
in holding that the use of the word child or children as 
used in the la'v of succession means the legitimate chil-
dren. 
There are nmnerous cases involving statutes like or 
substantially like our Section 1943, 101-4-10 where it is 
held that such language does not make an illegitimate 
child legitimate so as to entitle it to inherit from anyone 
other than as the statute provides-its parents. Among 
such cases are : 
Heck v. Smith, 94 Ga. 809, 22 S.E. 153; 
Hunt v. Hunt, 37 Me. 333; 
Eddie v. Eddie, 8 N.D. 376, 73 Am. St. Rep. 
765, 79 N.W. 856; 
Stafford v. Houghton, 48 Vt. 236; 
Reynolds v. Hitchcock, 72 N.H. 340, 56 Atl. 
745; 
Williams v. Kimball, 35 Fla. 491, 84 Am. St .. 
Rep. 238, 16 So. 783 ; 
Haraden v. Larrabee, 113 Mass. 430; 
Thigpen v. Thigpen, 136 Ga. 541; 71 S.E. 790; 
Voorhees v. Sharp, 63 N.J. Eq. 216; 49 Atl. 
722; 
Re Mericho 63 How Pr (N.Y.) 62; 
Waggoner v. Miller, 26 N.C. 486; 
Brown v. Kerby, 9 Humph, Tenn. 460; 
Jackson v. Jackson, 78 Ky. 390; 39 Am. Rep. 
246; 
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See 24 A.L.R. page 577, et seq. 
Pratt v. Atwood, 108 Mass. 40; 
There are a few cases containing similar language 
where a different result has been reached, but as stated 
by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in the case of 
Reynolds v. Hitchcock, supra, the language of the statutes 
so construed is much broader than that used in the New 
Hampshire statute and is likewise much broader than 
the language of our statute, U.C.A. 1943, 101-4-10. 
In the light of the decision of our Supreme Court 
in the case of Mansfield v. N eft, 43 Ut. 258; 134 Pac. 1160, 
we have probably gone to greater pains in directing the 
attention of the court to cases from other jurisdictions 
where statutes similar to our Section 101-4-10 have been 
construed. That Section was Section 714, Compiled Laws 
of Utah 1876. It is identical with Section 2833 R. S. 1898; 
Sec. 2833 Camp. Laws of Utah 1907. This section is also 
identical with Vol. 2, Sec. 27 42, 27 43, Compiled Laws of 
Utah, 1917. It was thus in effect at the times involved 
in the case of Mansfield v. Neff, supra. 
We will quote at some length from that case; to-wit: 
"The principal contentions made by appellant, 
however, are based upon questions of law. He con-
tends that he and his sister still living, and the 
issue of the sister now deceased, are entitled to 
the property in question as the heirs of their 
father, Mathew Mansfield; that the latter was 
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the heir of John 1\I. ~Iansfield, who was his son 
by his plural wife, l\iargaret Haslam, the only 
daughter of John Hasla1n, deceased. In this con-
nection it is contended that under our statute 
( Comp. Law,.s 1907, section 2781, which was in 
force 'vhen John Haslam made his will, and has 
continued in force ever since) the will is of no 
force or effect as against John M. Mansfield. Said 
section reads as follows : 
" 'When any testator omits to provide in 
his will for any of his children or for the issue 
of any deceased child, unless it appears that 
such omission was intentional, such child or 
the issue of such child must have the same 
share in the estate of the testator as if he had 
died intestate, and succeeds thereto as pro-
vided in the preceding section.' 
"John M. Mansfield, it is contended, comes 
within the provisions of said section, because he 
was the only child and representative of John 
Haslam's only daughter, who was dead when the 
will was made and became effective. We cannot 
yield assent to these contentions. Under the com-
mon law, which was in force in the territory of 
Utah by virtue of the Organic Act, John M. Mans-
field was an illegitimate child, because he was the 
fruit of a plural and not of a legal marriage. If he 
was an illegitimate child, then he does not come 
within either the letter or the spirit of said section. 
The section was copied from the statutes of Mas-
sachusetts, and this identical question was 
squarely determined against appellant's conten-
tions by the Supreme Judicial Court of that state 
as early as 1854 in the case of Kent v. Barker, 2 
Gray (Mass.) 535. It was there held that the 
statute applies only to grandchildren who are con-
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ceived and born as the fruit of lawful marriage. 
Such a conclusion is reasonable. The statute is, 
in one sense, a restriction upon the right of dis-
position of property by will, and hence its terms 
should not be extended by implication. A grand-
father, under the common law, certainly was under 
no legal obligation to provide for an illegitimate 
grandchild, nor was such a child, under that law, 
an heir of his grandparent, and, if he was not, the 
statute could not have been intended for his pro-
tection. 
"This is clearly the logic of the case of Estate 
of Wardell, 57 Cal.· 484, where it is held that the 
provisions apply as between the Mother and her 
illegitimate child, for the reason that such child 
was the heir of the mother. The California case 
is therefore a negative authority for the respond-
ents. 
"It is contended, however, that the statute 
applied to John M. Mansfield, for the reason that, 
under the congressional act of March 22, 1882, 
known as the Edmunds Law (1 C.L. Utah 1888, 
p. 110), the issue of plural marriages horn before 
the 1st day of January, 1883 were legitimated. 
While it is true that the testator died in 1882, some 
time after the passage of the Edmunds Law, we 
think that by that act the status of illegitimate 
children was intended to be affected only as be-
tween themselves and their parents. It was not 
until the legislature of this state in 1896 ( Comp. 
Laws 1907, section 2850) passed a law, much more · 
sweeping in its scope and effect, that the chil--
dren who were born prior to January 4, 1896, as 
the fruit of plural marriages, were legitimated for 
all purposes. See Rohwer v. District Court, 41 
Utah 279, 125 Pac. 671, where we held that it was 
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only after the statute of 1896, and the other stat-
utes there mentioned, and not otherwise, that a 
father could inherit from his illegitin1ate child. 
The Yie,Ys held by the majority of this court in 
the Roh"~er case are fully supported by the Su-
preme Court of the United States in Cope v. Cope, 
137 l .... S. GS:2, 11 Sup. Ct. 222, 34 L. Ed. 832. There, 
is however, nothing said in either one of those 
cases from "\vhich it can logically be inferred that 
the right of inheritance of illegitimate children 
"\Yas extended so as to make them heirs of their 
grandparents. The right of inheritance of illegiti-
mate children is purely statutory, and, unless the 
right is given by statute, no such right exists, be-
cause the common law conferred none. 
"We are of the opinion, therefore, that neither 
John M. ~iansfield nor his father, nor the latter's 
heirs, can assail the will of John Haslam, because 
it was not made to appear that the latter had in-
tentionally excluded John M. Mansfield from the 
will, for the reason that the latter was not an heir 
of John Haslam at the time of the latter's death, 
or at any other time." 
It will be seen from the foregoing history of Section 
101-4-10 that such section was a part of our statutory law 
at all times involved in the Mansfield v. Neff case, yet it 
was held that such law did not render one who was born 
when such law was in effect was by such law made legi-
timate. It is further worthy of note that the law was 
taken from Massachusetts where its Supreme Court had 
held and still holds that such statute does not render 
an illegitimate child entitled to inherit from anyone other 
than its parents. The case of Mansfield v. Neff has never 
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been reversed and is, we submit, binding upon this court. 
Obviously the doctrine announced in the case of Mans-
field v. Neff, supra, the claimant was not entitled to in-
herit from the father of Henry Charles Denhalter because 
he was not mentioned in the will of the former. 
In the court below the counsel for the plaintiff seems 
to get some comfort out of the case of Rohwer v. District 
Court of First Judicial District, 41 Utah 279; 125 Pac. 
671. It will be noted that the language of the act there 
involved provided that such children (the issue of plural 
marriages) are hereby legitimated and such issue are 
entitled to inherit from both parents and to have and en-
joy all rights and privileges to the same extent and in 
the same manner as though born in lawful wedlock. 
As we read the case it makes against and not in sup-
port of claimant's contention. Thus the Court holds that 
section 2850 Comp. Laws of Utah 1907, which section 
was involved in that case, applied only to plural mar-
riages. On page 287 of the Utah report it is said : "In 
what way do any or all nf the foregoing provisions ex-
cept those found in section 2850 make the children of 
void marriages legitimate so as to escape the consequence 
of that condition~ The answer is obvious. Neither one 
nor all of those provisions have or were intended to have 
such effect and a child which is the issue of a so-called 
plural marriage or Mormon marriage is no doubt an il-
legitimate child and, if it were not for the provisions of 
section 2850, would have to suffer all the legal if not all 
the social consequence of that status." 
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At the ti1ne involved in the last above cited case, 
section 101-4-10 is identical 'vith section 2833 mentioned 
in that opinion. Thus it will be seen that the court ex-
pressly held that a child who merely brings itself within 
the provisions of 2833 Laws of Utah 1907 now U.C.A., 
1943 101-4-10 does not thereby render such child legiti-
mate so as to entitle it to inherit from anyone other than 
its parents. It may also be noted that Section 14-4-12 of 
Utah Code Annotated 1943 is identical with Section 10 
of Title 2, Comp. Laws of Utah 1907. It is expressly 
held that the child whose rights were involved in the 
Rohwer v. District Court of First Judicial District case 
that section 10 of Title 2, Comp. Laws of Utah 1907 did 
not aid the claimant in that case and by the same token 
the provisions of 14-4-12 of U.C.A. cannot aid plaintiff's 
claim in this case. 
It may be noted that under our statutory law even if 
it be determined that Henry Charles Denhalter is the 
natural father of claimant's father, he could not under 
any circumstances inherit from him. U.C.A. 1943 101-41-
11 provides that: 
"If an illegitimate child dies intestate, without 
leaving husband or wife or lawful issue, his estate 
goes to his Mother or, in case of her decease, to 
her heirs at law." 
Another fact in this case which under many of the 
authorities constitutes an impediment to claimant being 
entitled to any of the estate of Mrs. Lewis is U.C.A. 1943 
14-4-6, which provides that: 
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"A· child when adopted may take the family 
name of the person adopting. After adoption, the 
two shall sustain the legal relation of parent and 
child, and have all the rights and be subject to all 
the duties of that relation." 
U.C.A. 1943 14-4-11 provides: 
"The natural parents of an adopted child are 
from the time of the adoption relieved of all pa-
ternal duties towards and all responsibility for 
the child so adopted, and have no further rights 
over it." 
In this case the father of the claimant was taken 
by the J ohnstons immediately after its birth and there-
after adopted. Under such a state of facts, we find the 
law thus stated in 10 C.J.S. 111: 
"In some jurisdictions the adoption of an il-
legitimate child does not deprive such child of the 
right ·conferred by statute to inherit from her 
natural parents. It has been held, however, that 
while the adoption of an illegitimate child pursu-
ant to the applicable statute does not deprive him 
of the right to inherit from his natural parent 
where such adoption occurs after the death of the 
parent, the rule, is otherwise as to the right of an 
illegitimate child to inherit from the kindred of 
the deceased parent where the adoption is by 
strangers and occurs before the death of such 
kindred." 
Under such doctrine the claimant must fail in this 
case because both he and his father were adopted by 
strangers before the death of Mrs. Lewis. 
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MoreoYer, the follo""ing- cases support the view that 
an adopted child 1nay not inherit from its natural parents. 
In re H,unsicker-Halterman et al v. Fillencer et al, 65 Cal. 
App. 114; 223 Pac. 411: In re Darling 173 Cal. 221; 1~9 
Pac. 606; Stamford Trust Co. v. Lokwood, 93 Conn. 337; 
119 Atl. 218. 
In light of the fact that our statutes relating to adop-
tion are taken from California, the cases above cited from 
that state should be entitled to great weight in this state. 
By way of summary, the appellants contend: 
1. That the trial court erred in admitting the hear-
say testimony of claimant's witnesses, Mr. Clark and 
Mrs. Loveless. 
2. That there is not sufficient competent evidence 
to support the finding that the claimant is the natural 
grandson of Henry Charles Denhalter. 
3. That even if it be concluded that Henry Charles 
Denhalter was the grandfather of the claimant, such fact 
does not entitle the claimant to participate in the estate 
of Mignon D. Lewis, deceased, because the only two 
statutes in Utah that legitimates an illegitimate child are: 
U.C.A. 1943 12-2-14 and U.C.A. 1943 14-4-12 and that 
the claimant does not bring himself within the provisions 
of either of those statutes. 
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4. That U.C.A. 1943 101-4-10 is calculated to grant 
to an illegitimate child the right to inherit from the 
parents but not from collateral blood relatives. 
5. That the father of the claimant having been 
adopted by the J ohnstons and the claimant by English, 
he is precluded from participating in the estate of Mrs. 
Lewis, even though he be held to be a blood relative. 
It is submitted that the Decree and Judgment ap-
pealed from should be reversed and that it be determined 
that the claimant is not entitled to participate in the dis-
tribution of the estate of Mignon D. Lewis, deceased, and 
that appellants be awarded their costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELIAS HANSEN 
.Attorney for· .Appellants 
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